rights based fishing: evidence from the new zealand rock lobster fishery basil m.h. sharp department of economics t

Rights Based Fishing:
Evidence from the New Zealand Rock Lobster Fishery
Basil M.H. Sharp
Department of Economics
The University of Auckland
Chris J. Batstone
Economics Academic Group
Auckland University of Technology
Abstract
In the real world of fisheries management few are based on tradable
rights to harvest. This paper provides evidence that supports the
effectiveness of rights based management in addressing the twin ills
of fisheries management, unsustainable harvest and economic
inefficiency. Econometric modelling is based on two independent data
sets. The first data set was obtained from annual surveys conducted
over a nine-year period. These data provide an opportunity for the
application of panel data techniques. The second data set was obtained
from quota market information and provides a basis for times series
modelling. Two panel data models point to the significance of labour,
non-labour expenditures capital and the total allowable commercial
catch is determining sales. Times series analysis of quota market data
points to a relationship between asset price as the dependent
variable, and annual lease price, allowable catch, interest rates and
the export price index. Both panel data models show the significance
of natural capital and manufactured capital. The role of the allowable
catch in the two panel data models and the time series model
highlights the import role the allowable catch plays in determining
profitability, firm-level decision making, and sustainable fisheries
management.
JEL Q22, C22, C23
INTRODUCTION
In the real world of fisheries management few are based on tradable
rights to harvest. Economic theory suggests that rights-based
fisheries should yield higher economic rents relative to other forms
of governance provided, of course, that the harvest is kept within
sustainable limits. This paper provides evidence that supports the
effectiveness of rights based management in addressing the twin ills
of fisheries management, unsustainable harvest and economic
inefficiency.
The paper is structured as. The second section of this paper describes
the property rights in New Zealand’s fisheries. The third section
presents results of econometric analysis using two independent data
sets. The first data set was obtained from annual surveys conducted
over a nine-year period. These data provide an opportunity for the
application of panel data techniques. The second data set was obtained
from quota market information and provides a basis for times series
modeling. The paper concludes with a general discussion on research
findings and future research direction.
2. THE QUOTA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Rights-based fishing is centred on providing transferable rights to a
sustainable harvest (Q). Economic efficiency requires not only
transferability, but also setting an optimal harvest (Q*) and
competitive markets (Arnason, 1990). In many respects New Zealand’s
quota management system is similar to Arnason’s model, with two major
exceptions. First the total allowable catch (TAC) is set by a
fisheries management agency. Second, rights to harvest are
differentiated. Only commercial rights are tradable as individual
transferable quota (ITQ). With respect to ITQ, competitive markets
will ensure that more efficient firms get to harvest fish.
Furthermore, the market value of quota provides summary information
about current and future conditions in the fishery.
Let's now consider a shared fishery. Assume that the TAC = Q* and that
the present value of net benefit to two groups ‑ commercial and
non‑commercial fishers ‑ is NBC and NBNC respectively. Sutinen (1996)
has shown that the TAC should be allocated in such a way that that the
present value of net benefits are equalised. If the right to harvest
is not differentiated, then competition will result in a uniform price
P*. Commercial fishers will harvest and the non‑commercial
such that . Provided the TAC is set at the optimal level Q*
use of the right is immaterial to achieving efficiency. In the
uncertain world of fisheries management it is highly unlikely that Q*
will be discovered. Provided rights to the TAC are undifferentiated
competition in the quota market will ensure rights gravitate to their
most highly valued use. This is not the case however in the rock
lobster fishery, rights are differentiated across a number of user
groups.
Rights to harvest rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) are defined in each
of the 10 quota management areas (QMAs) within New Zealand's EEZ. An
annual TAC is set for each stock, based on assessments of the maximum
sustainable yield (MSY). This provides a measure of the TAC by all
groups including commercial, recreational and traditional users. Once
the TACs have been determined, a total allowable commercial catch
(TACC) is set for each QMA, taking into account non‑commercial
interests in the fishery and any other relevant environmental social,
cultural or economic factors. Each TACC is then allocated amongst
quota owners as ITQ in proportion to their ownership.
A net‑benefit maximising allocation of the TAC requires a balancing of
net benefits between commercial and non‑commercial allocations.
Arnason's (1990) proposition that ITQ prices are functionally related
to profit and that quota prices can be used to inform the fisheries
management process has been empirically confirmed (Batstone and Sharp
forthcoming). Unfortunately the existing institutional structure does
not generate data on the value of fishing to non‑commercial groups
outside the QMS. This asymmetry makes it extremely difficult to
allocate the TAC using a net‑benefit maximising criterion.
Quota rights are held in perpetuity, they are transferable, and can be
transformed into derivative rights such as a lease. Quota rights are
property and are used as security by creditors. Initially quota rights
were defined as a right to a tonnage in perpetuity. The original
adjustment mechanism had government entering the market as a seller of
rights if stock assessments warranted increasing the commercial
harvest, as a buyer if the commercial harvest exceeded that considered
sustainable. A review of fisheries legislation concluded that this
mechanism created incentives to fully harvest the TACC because
government would provide compensation ‑ through its buying activities
in the quota market ‑ for any reduction (Ministry of Fisheries 1992).
In 1990 legislation redefined quota rights as a percentage of the
TACC. The change to proportional ITQ shifts the distribution of stock
adjustment risk from government to industry.
Any changes to the TACC are pro‑rated across ITQ owners. For TACC
increases, existing ITQ owners enjoy the benefits of extra harvest at
no cost. For TACC decreases, existing ITQ owners suffered reduced
harvest with no compensation. In order to gain support for the change
to proportional ITQ rights an "Accord" was negotiated between
government and industry to provide compensation payments over a
transition period to 1994. During this period resource rentals, were
set aside to compensate quota owners for TACC reductions.
Where catches are taken in excess of quota holdings, the permit holder
may purchase further quota, lease further quota or land catches
against another firm's quota holdings. Quota owners have additional
flexibility to balance catches against quota holdings. In any year
owners can carry forward uncaught quota to the next year, provided it
is not more than 10% of their holdings for that fish stock. Conversely
they may take catches up to 10% more than their quota holdings, the
additional amount of catch being deducted from their subsequent years
catch entitlement.
The ability to accurately monitor catch levels and balance these
against quota holdings is critical to the success of the QMS. The
Ministry of Fisheries has established procedures to monitor and
enforce the QMS based on a system that tracks the flow of fish and
fish products from the catcher to the purchaser and then to reconcile
these catches with quota holdings. Fishing permit holders are required
to provide detailed catch reports, along with additional information
on effort. Permit holders are required to complete a report at the end
of each fishing trip to record catch details (including vessel,
location, species and quantities), which quota the catches are to be
counted against and to whom the fish is sold. Commercial fishers are
restricted to selling fish to licensed wholesalers and processors.
Licensed receivers are also required to provide monthly reports. These
sources of information enable the Ministry to monitor catches against
quota holdings and audit records.
During each fishing year, catches by quota holders are progressively
counted against their quota holdings. Comprehensive and strict
reporting procedures are in place. Detailed reporting of catches at
sea by permit holders and transfers onshore to licensed fish receivers
ensure a robust documentation of catches and their distribution.
Compliance with these reporting regimes is substantially based on
auditing of these paper trails; although a range of other surveillance
procedures are also used. Penalties for non‑compliance or avoidance
are severe, including forfeiture of quota and property upon
conviction, and exclusion from the fishing industry. Test cases in the
New Zealand courts have upheld the fisheries legislation, and for the
most part, compliance levels are high.
Government was committed to resource rentals when the QMS was
introduced. From the outset, government made it clear that it intended
to increase resource rentals until the value of annual traded quota
approached zero. Payment was based on ITQ holdings, regardless of
whether fish were harvested. The rental varied across species and was
not paid on quota held by government. At the time, the Minister had
the right to vary ‑ up to 20% increase ‑ resource rentals each year.
In setting the rental the Minister was required to have regard to the
value of quota, the impact on net commercial returns, and relevant
changes to the TACO. Resource rentals were to be paid into the
Fisheries Fund, which was to be used to finance management and
research activities. The fund was never established, and rentals were
paid into government's consolidated fund. Resource rentals were one of
the most contentious elements of government's fisheries policy.
Industry vigorously opposed resource rentals. Even if tradable rights
create an economic surplus in the fishery, the problem of determining
government's share of the surplus was not straightforward. Each year
significant resources were allocated ‑‑ by industry and government ‑‑
to present convincing arguments for, and against, changes to resource
rentals. Resource rentals contributed to commercial uncertainty in the
fishery.
Cost recovery was introduced in 1994, after the switch to proportional
ITQ and removal of resource rentals. Cost recovery is based on the
notion of avoidable cost and applies only to the commercial fishery.
The government levy includes an ITQ levy and a conservation services
levy. The levy does not apply to all quotas. The government pays the
costs associated with non‑commercial fishing and any joint costs
shared by these two broad groups. Revenue from cost recovery is used
to pay for fisheries management, research and compliance activities of
the Ministry of Fisheries.
======================================================================
3. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Rock lobster were introduced into the QMS in 1990. The New Zealand
rock lobster industry faces harvest limits, receives no subsidies from
government and exports more than 90 percent of the harvest. Firms
operating in this environment must look to technologies that economise
on scarce harvesting rights, value‑adding processes, formation of
industry associations, and stock enhancement, to increase profit.
Table 1 shows the TACC (aggregated over all QMAs) falling over the
period 1991 through 2001. The percentage of the TACC caught has
increased from 85% to 98%, as has the catch per unit effort (CPUE).
Table 1: Commercial catch summary 1992‑2001
Year
TACC
Catch
% Caught
CPUE
1991/92
3,616
3,066
85
0.47
1992/93
3,265
2,644
82
0.42
1993/94
2,913
2,755
95
0.39
1994/95
2,913
2,622
90
0.45
1995/96
2,913
2,536
87
0.58
1996/97
2,954
2,645
90
0.70
1997/98
2,865
2,553
89
0.79
1998/09
2,927
2,718
93
0.88
1999/00
2,849
2,748
96
na
2000/01
2,849
2,799
98
na
Source: Clement and Associates (2001), Ministry of Fisheries
The volume and the value of rock lobster exports are shown in Table 2.
Using 1986 (when the QMS was introduced) as a benchmark, total seafood
exports for year ended 2000 had increased by 176% in volume and by
217% in nominal value. In contrast rock lobster volumes declined as
TACC reductions took hold, but the real value of the rock lobster
catch has increased. Over the period of the analysis monetary
inflation has been low (0-2% p.a) and the exchange rate environment
favourable to exporters. Growth in the volume and value of rock
lobster exports is shown in Table 2. In 2000 rock lobster ranks third
in export earnings ($129 m), behind Hoki ($311 m) and mussels ($169
m). Japan is New Zealand's largest seafood export market ($318 m),
with USA ($258 m) and European Union ($219 m) second and third
respectively (New Zealand Seafood Industry, 2001).
Table 2: Exports 1986 and 1999‑2000
1986 a
1999
2000
Commodity
Tonnes
(000)
$ m
(fob)
Tonnes
(000)
$ m
(fob)
Tonnes
(000)
$m
(fob)
Rock lobster
3.1
104.2
3.1
114.5
2.8
129.0
Total seafood exports
158.1
657.3
328.4
1,179.2
279.2
1,430.9
Source: Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand Seafood Industry (2001)
Data obtained from the annual enterprise survey of rock lobster firms
are summarised in Table 3. The data have are expressed in $1992.
Average labour input has declined in recent years, the value of total
assets per labour equivalent has increased and non-labour expenditure
per labour equivalent has increased. These results should be
considered alongside the TACC for the rock lobster industry, which, if
anything has declined over the same period.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for rock lobster
Year
Av. Net Rev.
($000)
TFTE
Total assets ($000) per FTE
Total expenditure
($000) per FTE
1992
117.4
2.7
91.8
52.7
1993
104.4
2.7
97.2
57.0
1994
41.3
2.7
114.1
69.9
1995
124.4
3.9
139.2
67.9
1996
113.4
3.2
133.2
75.3
1997
95.8
2.9
137.5
78.9
1998
100.0
2.0
236.2
85.1
1999
117.9
1.6
219.0
77.9
2000
200.5
1.8
284.9
101.4
Source: Annual Enterprise Survey, Statistics New Zealand
TFTE =Total Fulltime Equivalents
FTE = Full time Equivalent
Av. Net Rev = Average Net Revenue
Panel Data Models
-----------------
It is of interest to examine panel data for evidence of a functional
relationship between sales (output) and labour, non-labour
expenditures capital and the TACC. The formulation in terms of a
general production function is h* is

where and vi is unrestricted (Greene, l993).
The analysis is based on panel data obtained from the Annual
Enterprise Survey (Department of Statistics, New Zealand). The data is
an unbalanced panel drawn from rock lobster firms over 9 years, from
1992 through 2000. The data were deflated to 1992 values. If the ui's
are treated as firm‑specific constants the model may be estimated by
OLS as a "fixed effects" model. The fixed effects model removes the
assumption that firm inefficiencies are uncorrelated with input
levels. Hausman and Taylor (1981) provide conditions for identifying
fixed effects. If the assumption of independence of the inefficiencies
vi's and input levels can be maintained then Green (1993) suggests
that a random effects model may be appropriate. Estimation then
proceeds with generalised least squares. The advantage of the random
effects model is that it allows time‑invariant firm‑specific
attributes ‑ such as the size of the firm's capital stock that is not
growing ‑ to enter the model.
Table 4 contains estimates for both a fixed effects model (using OLS)
and a random effects model (using GLS). The panel included 9 years of
data obtained from a sample of rock lobster firms. Annual TACC levels,
as summarised in Table 1, were incorporated into the data set. The
results show the significance of the TACC, labour, firm assets and
non‑labour inputs into the production process. The LM statistic is not
large and suggests that there is considerable homogeneity across rock
lobster fishing firms. This seems reasonable given the characteristics
of rock lobster fishing. The Hausman statistic bears on the question
of which estimator, random or fixed effects, is to be preferred. The
Hausman statistic is larger than the critical value which
weighs in favour of the fixed effects approach.
Table 4 : Estimates of panel data models
Dependent variable: real value of sales
Number of observations: 1075
Variable
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
Labour
34.27
(19.36)*
31.14
(19.2)*
Non-labour costs
1.55
(0.01)* *
1.56
(0.01)*
Real value of assets
0.06
(0.01)**
0.06
(0.01)**
TACC
158172038
(130897040)**
216.59
(106.90)*
Constant
-542853.7
(314315.2)*
Hausman test
130.03
LM test
3.94
R
0.92
0.92
Evidence from quota markets
We have argued that information generated through trades in quota
markets can also provide useful information (Batstone and Sharp,
forthcoming). Table 5 summarises quota and (annual) lease prices over
the period 1991 through 1999 for CRA2, one of the rock lobster QMAs.
The ratio of lease to asset price provides an indication of the return
quota ownership. The annual average ratio of lease price to quota
price has been trending down since 1991.
Table 5: Annual prices in CRA2 quota market 1991 through 1999
Year
TACC
Quota price
Lease price
Lease price to
quota price ratio
1991/92
3,616
53,016
8,022
0.15
1992/93
3,265
93,574
9,911
0.11
1993/94
2,913
109,764
11,105
0.10
1994/95
2,913
180,258
13,408
0.07
1995/96
2,913
239,851
17,022
0.07
1996/97
2,954
243,275
12,901
0.05
1997/98
2,865
229,286
17,254
0.08
1998/99
2,927
217,222
18,020
0.08
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between CPUE and lease price.
The positive association is to be expected because increasing catch
per unit effort should be reflected in annual profit. Figure 2 shows
in greater detail the relationship between asset price and lease
price. Finally, Figure 3 shows the relationship between the ratio of
lease to asset price (the implicit discount rate) and interest rates.
It would appear that the implicit rate has been trending down toward
the market interest. A simple linear regression based on these data
finds a significant (1% level) negative relationship between the ratio
of lease price to asset price and time over the period.
[Figure 1]
Figure 1: Relationship between lease price and annual catch per unit
effort
[Figure 2]
Figure 2: Times series of asset price and lease prices
[Figure 3]
Figure 3: Times series of implicit discount rate and interest rate
We can describe the determinants of asset prices in greater detail
using the following model
A=f (P,C,TACC)
where A = asset price, P= landed price of rock lobster, C = costs, and
TACC = the allowable harvest. We can't observe P and C but we can
infer profit from lease trades. Thus the regressions shown in Table 6
are based on a relationship between asset price as the dependent
variable and lease price, TACC, interest rate, and the export price
index (FOB) as independent variables.
Table 6: Regression results for CRA2
Dependent variable: Quota price
Number of observations: 55
Independent variables
Model 1
Model 2
(logs)
Constant
333988.00
(124033)**
23.58
(6.02)**
Lease price
13.88
(1.37)**
1.11
(0.12)**
TACC
-1503.00
(579.92)**
-3.84
(1.06)**
FOB
-1294.24
(922.47)
-0.43
(0.30)
Interest rate
3991.91
(5317.03)
0.01
(0.25)
R
0.76
0.79
D-W Statistic
1.55
1.74
F-Statistic
40.79
48.08
These results confirm that annual lease prices are related to asset
prices. Of interest is the significance level of the coefficient
attached to the TACC. This result is also encouraging because it
conforms to the underlying theory of demand.
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Tradable rights, a relatively competitive industry structure, and a
largely deregulated economy, provide the necessary incentives for
efficient and sustainable development of the fishery. The QMS has
provided a basis upon which the rock lobster fishing industry has
evolved into a dynamic and profitable sector that makes a significant
contribution to seafood exports. Moreover, this outcome has been
achieved without subsidy, with harvest controls and cost recovery for
management, research and compliance, and within competitive export
markets. This is a remarkable achievement relative to the state of the
fishery prior to the implementation of the QMS (Sharp, 1997).
The structural features of the QMS have proved to be quite robust and
amenable to performance enhancing changes to harvesting rights. The
two structural pillars of the system have endured for 15 years.
Tradable rights have unleashed a dynamic that is reflected in the
summary statistics presented above. Over the period 1992-2000 rock
lobster fishers have slightly reduced labour, increased non-labour
expenditures, and enhanced the value of their capital assets. The TACC
has been reduced over the period and the percentage of the TACC caught
has increased. Indications are that the catch per unit effort has
increased.
Econometric modelling, using two data sets, supports the general
observations. Two panel data models point to the significance of
labour, non-labour expenditures capital and the TACC is determining
sales. If we use quota market data we find a relationship between
asset price as the dependent variable, and annual lease price, TACC,
interest rates and the export price index. These results, although
preliminary at this stage, are encouraging. Both panel data models
show the significance of natural capital (implicit in the TACC) and
manufactured capital. Both variables play a role in determining
output. Summary statistics indicate an increase in the average level
of manufactured capital over time as the supply of natural capital
available to the industry was reduced. Second, the role of the TACC in
the two panel data models and the time series model is significant.
Elsewhere (Batstone and Sharp, forthcoming) we shown how times series
modelling can provide some guidance on adjusting the TACC and
assessing the benefits and costs of biological research.
We are planning to estimate stochastic frontier models using the panel
data set. This should provide further insights into efficiency within
the rock lobster fishery. It will also be of interest to compare
efficiencies across sectors within the fishing industry.
References
Annual Enterprise Survey, Statistics New Zealand, Wellington.
Arnason, R. 1990. Minimum Information Management in Fisheries.
Canadian Journal of Economics 23: 630-653.
Batstone, C.J. and B.M.H. Sharp, 1999. New Zealand’s Quota Management
System: The First Ten Years. Marine Policy 23(2):177-190.
Batstone, C.J. and B.M.H. Sharp (forthcoming). Minimum Information
management Systems and ITQ Fisheries Management Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management.
Clement and Associates. 2001. New Zealand Commercial Fisheries: The
Atlas of Area Codes and TACCs, 2001/2002, Clement and Associates,
Tauranga.
Fried, H.O, C.A. Lovell and S.S. Schmidt. 1993. The Measurement of
Productive Efficiency: Techniques and Applications, New York, Oxford
University Press.
Fuss, M., D. McFadden, and Y. Mundlak. 1978. A Survey of Functional
Forms in the Economic Analysis of Production, in Fuss, M. and D.
McFadden, Production Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory and
Applications, vol. 1, North Holland.
Greene, W.H. 1993. The Econometric Approach to Efficiency Analysis, in
Fried, H.O, C.A. Lovell and S.S. Schmidt (eds), The Measurement of
Productive Efficiency: Techniques and Applications, New York, Oxford
University Press.
Greene, W.H. 1995.LIMDEP Version 7.0, New York, Econometric Software,
Inc.
Greene, W.H. 2000. Econometric Analysis, 4th Edition, Prentice Hall.
Hausman, J. and W. Taylor. 1981. Panel data and unobservable
individual effects, Econometrica, 49: 1377-1398.
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 1992. Fisheries Task Force,
Sustainable Fisheries/Tiakina nga Taonga a Tangaroa, Report of the
Fisheries Task Force to the Minister of Fisheries on the Review of
Fisheries Legislation, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,
Wellington.
New Zealand Seafood Industry. 2001. New Zealand’s Seafood Business.
http://www.seafood.co.nz.
Sharp, B.M.H. 1997. From Regulated Access to Transferable Harvesting
Rights: Lessons From New Zealand. Marine Policy 21(6):501-517.
Sutinen, J. G. 1996. Recreational Entitlements: Integrating
Recreational Fisheries into New Zealand’s Quota Management System. A
report prepared for the Minister of Fisheries, Government of New
Zealand: Wellington.
FIGURE 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

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