POLS Student January 2006 Clapsa Dmitri Long Way Towards

pols student january, 2006 clapsa dmitri long way towards parliamentary system in moldova or unexpected results: communist’s takeover o

POLS student January, 2006
Clapsa Dmitri
Long Way towards Parliamentary System in Moldova or Unexpected
Results: Communist’s takeover of Power
Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union many countries were under the
dilemma of what kind of political system to choose. Definitely, the
states who gained independence relied on democratic system and
practices as the “only game in the town”1. However, within this
democratic system different forms of government exist, which country
has to choose in establishing or amending constitution.
This work examines the formation of the form of government in Moldova.
It covers the history of the constitution making, formation of
parliamentary system, which was the outcome of the struggle between
president and legislature2. I will also talk about the features of the
present situation of the country under the rule of the Communist Party
of Moldova and how it undermines the effect of parliamentary system.
While making the research on Moldova, I came across the fact that
there is no tentative research or work done by Moldavian researchers
in this field. Most of the sources I used are performed by foreign
scientists, researchers and media. It could raise some limitations,
however, it is good opportunity for me to bring first source
information as an insider and observer of most of the political
battles occurred in Moldova.
Independence and Constitution building
In this chapter I will talk about the gaining of independence by the
Republic of Moldova. I will tend to stress on the period and process
of the constitution building. Moreover, I will study questions and
aspect which influenced the adoption of new Constitution of the
Republic of Moldova.
Prior to the official declaration of independence some democratic
elections and nationalistic movements took place. On August 27, 1991,
Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union and became a
sovereign state, an act that consummated the process of escalating
political self-assertion under way since 1988. Before this date the
first democratic elections for the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSR
took place on February 25, 1990, which resulted in Popular Front
majority. The majority in the Popular Front and the introduction of
Moldavian language (Latin script) as a state language led to the
tension between the ethnic Romanians and non-Romanian minorities who
were concentrated in the Transdniestria (tiny part on the left part of
Dniester River), and Gagauzia (south region inhabited by Orthodox
Turks). Hence, independence process did not go smoothly and grew into
political and armed conflict.
Covering the reasons and details of bloody violent conflict on the
Dniester River in the 1992 goes beyond this work, but I want to point
out that Transdiestrian conflict and tensions which still remain after
the cease fire agreement signed by Moldavian president Snegur and
Yeltsin in July 1992 played important role in the constitution
formation and form of government. This can be shortly explained by the
agenda and policy towards conflict resolution used by presidents and
parties of Moldova in order to attract popular support of minorities.
Moreover, president was always considered as a guarantor of the
conflict solution, who had monthly meetings with unrecognized
president of Transdniestria, and who needed more authority for the
negotiations. Many of these aspects laid as the bricks in constitution
formation.
In addition to the armed conflict, Moldova experienced many
disadvantages inherited from the Soviet Union. One of the big problems
that country faced was the absence of democratic culture. Weak civil
society lacked “the institutional strength necessary to keep state
actors accountable on a regular basis”.3 Weak legal traditions led to
the biased and corrupted judiciary which played reasonable role in the
political battles. Partisan judiciary was often used by the political
officials of the Republic of Moldova to interpret Constitution in the
way favorable to those officials. Moreover, low democratic culture led
to a blurred constitution making process which was backed by the
politicians with no democratic experience and Soviet mentality.
Results were the ambitious presidents such as Mircea Snegur, Petru
Lucinschi, and Vladimir Voronin who always tended to explore
presidential authority.
In the face of ethnic conflict, weak civil society, rule of law and
economic decline, Moldova had the most strongly democratic polity in
the former Soviet Union.4 Legislative elections in Moldova caused
serious shifts in the parties, their agendas, and ideological
composition of the legislature.5 First elections to the Parliament
(104 seats) have taken place on 27 February, 1994. The largest
percentage of the votes went to the Democratic Agrarian Party (DAP)
43.18 %, led by the Andrei Sangheli and Petru Lucinschi. The DAP got
56 mandates in the new independent democratic Parliament of Moldova.
Socialist Party and "Unitate-Edinstvo" Movement Bloc (SPUEMB) received
22 % of popular votes and acquired 28 seats in the Parliament
correspondingly.6 9.21 % of votes were devoted to Peasants and
Intellectuals Bloc (PIB) who got 11 mandates, and 7.53 % of votes
constituting 9 parliamentary seats were received by the Alliance of
the Popular Christian Democratic Front (APCDF).7 Thus, legislature
elections based on high pluralism and parties’ shifts led to the low
mandates gained by rightist alliance (APCDF) which supported
charismatic nationalist leader and President Mircea Snegur. Election
results also reasoned the form of government established by the
Constitution.
Parliamentary elections posed a threat to President Mircea Snegur’s
broad power in the euphoria of independence, transition and conflict.
Parliament started to work fruitfully by drafting new constitution of
the Republic of Moldova. A new Constitution adopted on July 29, 1994
went into effect on 27 August 1994. First article of the Constitution
of the Republic of Moldova exposes general principles, which are very
important for the newly democratized country:
Article 1. The State of the Republic of Moldova
(1) The Republic of Moldova is a sovereign, independent, unitary and
indivisible state.
(2) The form of government of the State is the Republic.
(3) Governed by the rule of law, the Republic of Moldova is a
democratic State in which the dignity of people, their rights and
freedoms, the open development of human personality, justice and
political pluralism represent supreme values that shall be guaranteed.8
Finally, after 3 years of political tensions inside the country and
armed conflict, the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova went into
effect. The reasons which influenced constitution formation were
studied in this chapter. Lack of democratic culture, pluralism, biased
judiciary, territorial and linguistic conflicts, national movements,
and president’s role were the aspects which directly or indirectly
influenced the formation and content of the new constitution.
Political parties, which shifted, divided, changed its leaders, made
alliances all played reasonable role during these 3 years period for
constitution building, which resulted in the creation of
semi-presidentialism, which I am going to analyze in the next part of
this work.
Semi-Presidentialism
First of all I would like to define semi-presidentialism relying on
the theoretical base. Secondly, I will compare the powers of the
Parliament, President, and Government of Moldova foreseen by the
Constitution, and how they correspond to the theory of
semi-presidentialism. Finally, I will attempt to answer the question:
“Did the new Constitution of the Republic of Moldova presuppose
semi-residential form of government?”
In defining semi-presidential system I will use jointly applied
characteristics introduced by Sartori, which are so clear that I can
not keep myself from citing them all:
i.
The head of state (president) is elected by popular vote – either
directly or indirectly – for a fixed term of office.
ii.
The head of state shares the executive power with a prime
minister, thus entering a dual authority structure whose three
defining criteria are:
iii.
The president is independent from parliament, but is not entitled
to govern alone or directly and therefore his will must be
conveyed and processed via his government.
iv.
Conversely, the prime minister and his cabinet are
president-independent in that they are parliament-dependent: they
are subject to either parliamentary confidence or no-confidence
(or both), and in either case need the support of a parliamentary
majority.
v.
The dual authority structure of semi-presidentialism allows for
different balances and also for shifting prevalences of power
within the executive, under the strict condition that the
‘autonomy potential’ of each component unit of the executive does
subsist.9
I assume that there are other defining characteristics proposed by
famous scientists, though I find Sartori’s properties most theoretical
and precise.
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova established certain important
powers for the Parliament. According to the constitution, Moldova is a
democracy with a unicameral legislature, the Moldovan Parliament,
members of which “are elected by voting based on universal, equal,
direct, secret and freely expressed suffrage”10. Among the basic
powers stipulated by the Constitution there are important ones such as
authority: “to pass laws, decisions and motions”, “to control the
executive power” (vote of confidence or no-confidence to the Prime
Minister and Government), and to amend constitution.11 Right of
confidence or no-confidence to the Prime Minister and his cabinet by
Moldovian Parliament is the characteristic that corresponds to the
Sartori’s definition of semi-presidential system.
Having defined Parliament powers, it is time to pass towards analysis
of President power stipulated in the Constitution. Consequently, the
head of the state is the President of the Republic of Moldova, who
shares executive power with the Government. Under constitutional
arrangements prevailing at the time of the 1990 national elections,
the President was elected by members of the Supreme Soviet, but
provisions introduced in 1991 called for the President's direct
election by all members of the population over eighteen years of age.12
According to the Constitution President is elected for a four-year
term of office by open, free popular voting. President acquires powers
such as ability to designate a candidate for the office of Prime
Minister supported by the vote of confidence of the Parliament, to
revoke or renominate certain members of the government according to
the proposals from the Prime Minister.13 President also has the power
to dissolve Parliament in case of deadlock in forming the Government
and impasse in passing of new legislation for 3 consecutive months.14
President authorities under Constitution clearly coincide with
theoretical characteristics. Head of the state is elected popularly,
which gives him broad legitimation, however, President experiences the
cohabitation with the Prime Minister, which is embodied in the dual
authority.
Government of the Republic of Moldova consists of the cabinet, Prime
Minister and the first deputy Prime Minister.15 Actions of the Prime
Minister, who is the head of the cabinet, are sufficiently limited.
According to the Article 101 of the Constitution Prime Minister should
inform the President of the Republic on “matters of special
importance”, however, it is vague statement in my opinion as can be
interpreted differently.16 What can be especially important for the
President, may seem not that important for the Prime Minister. Such
uncertain provision may lead to the disturbance of the work of the
Prime Minister, however, from the other side it leads to the checks of
the government work by the President.
Thus, having analyzed the powers of Parliament, President, and
Government, I came to conclusion that they coincide with the
characteristics of the semi-presidentialism by Sartori. There is dual
authority structure, but with weak Prime Minister and stronger
President. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova is
president-independent (however history showed that it was not always
the case), and parliamentary dependent. I can deduct that political
system implied by the Constitution fits the Sartori’s model of
semi-residential form. Hence, the answer to the question raised at the
beginning of this chapter is discovered. If the characteristics of
power interaction and authority of Parliament, President, and
Government go under theoretical framework, then the Constitution of
the Republic of Moldova presupposes the semi-presidential form of
government. Definitely, in practice it was not always true, as
Moldavian Presidents always tended to increase their power and even
did it in contradiction with the constitution, which led to the high
confrontation with the Parliament and the establishment of the
parliamentary system.
From Semi-Presidentialism to Parliamentarism
This chapter will deal with political battles and confrontation
between President Lucinschi and Parliament. It will show how Moldova
moved from the semi-presidential system to the parliamentary one.
Lucinschi tended to increase his power and establish presidential
system. However, he faced high confrontation from the Parliament,
which established parliamentary system in the Republic. I consider
that it was mainly done in order to diminish the influence of
Lucinschi, and not as a rational trend towards parliamentarism. This
chapter may seem a little bit detailed, but I think it will help to
follow the trend of tensions and outcome.
The presidential elections on November 17, 1996 showed high
competition between two ambitious leaders, the incumbent Snegur, and
the challenger, Lucinschi. With the turnout of about 70 % of eligible
population Mircea Snegur received 38.75 % of votes.17 Petru Lucinschi,
who was the speaker of the parliament, and who entered the run as
independent candidate acquired 27.66 % of popular votes.18 Lucinschi,
in comparison with Snegur who supported unity with Romania and
nationalistic ideas, was more centric. He promised to sign memorandum
granting Transdniestria autonomy, to open Slavic university, and more
concessions to minorities.19 Here we see the use of the topic of
Transdniestrian conflict by candidate in his electoral agenda as a
base for attracting minority’s support.
Due to big number of candidates and low percentage gained by
candidates, second round of president elections took place, which was
not that successful for Mircea Snegur. According to the second round
of elections with 71.61 % popular participation Petru Lucinschi won
presidential run acquiring 54.02 % of votes, while Mircea Snegur
received 45.98 %.20 Presidential run was not successful for the first
president of the Republic of Moldova due to his too pro-Romanian
agenda and radical policy. Lucinschi’s centrist agenda helped him to
win the run. Right after the inauguration new president showed his
tendency towards the increase of presidential powers.
Semi-presidential form of government did not give Lucinschi too much
power. Lucinschi referred that he required the power to appoint the
Prime Minister, to dismiss ministers without approve of the head of
government, and more authority in solving Transdniestrian conflict.
The real political confrontation begins between President and
Parliament, which supports Mircea Snegur. Moldova faces gridlock, as
Parliament shots down any reform proposal by Lucinschi, even economic
reforms. 21 All this leads to the turmoil on the political arena and
even higher willingness of Lucinschi to explore his powers in order to
solve the situation.
President also had tensions with the Government and the Prime
Minister. It can be explained by difficult cohabitation process with
Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc, who supported “the formation of a
non-partisan government of “professional and competent” technocrats”.
President, supported by the Democratic Agrarian Party (DAP) was
against such appointments and insisted on the appointment of DAP
members.22 However, the Prime Minister was against it. Lucinschi
having high ambitions threatened his anti-supporters from the cabinet
of ministers by voiding their positions; however, constitution
(article 82) does not allow president to perform such actions, stating
that he can dismiss cabinet members only with consultation and
recommendation of the Prime Minister.23 Confrontation with government
added points to the president’s attempt to gain more power.
High political fights and shifts led to striking results on the
Parliament elections on March 22, 1998. Party of Communist gained
30.01 % of votes and received 40 mandates in 101 member unicameral
Parliament.24 The “Democratic Convention” Electoral Bloc (DC) founded
by the ex-president Mircea Snegur received 19.42 % of votes and
acquired 26 mandates in the Parliament.25 Snegur’s Bloc consisted from
radical right and nationalist parties, who supported the reunification
with Romania, Europeanization direction and support of Orthodox
Church.26 Two other parties “For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova”
Electoral Bloc (FDPM) [centrist] and Parties of Democratic Forces
(PDF) [center right] who supported the president Lucinschi took 18.16
% of votes or 24 seats and 8.84 % or 11 seats correspondingly.27
Lucinschi got low support in the Parliament and was enforced to look
for the backing from the communists.
Thus, the first wave of regaining power by communists began. It was
mainly due to endless battles between President and legislature, which
led to the economic regression and turmoil in the country. Moreover,
communists were mainly supported by old population whom they promised
higher pensions, and by minorities. However, from my own perspective,
such unexpected results on 1998 Parliament elections were due to the
only one alternative embodied in the Communist Party, because other
parties and leaders undermined people’s faith in democratic principles
by their political fights and inactions.
One very interesting thing I would like to mention in this chapter
relates to the political culture of newly independent Moldova. The
fact that yesterday enemies can become today’s allies played important
role in the shift to the parliamentarism. That happened after the 1998
Parliament elections by forming the Alliance for Democracy and Reform
(ADR) consisting of the “Democratic Convention” Electoral Bloc (DC),
“For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova” Electoral Bloc (FDPM), and
Parties of Democratic Forces (PDF).28 It was mainly done in order to
overbalance increasing power of the Party of Communists, who started
to gain power. Actually, that relates to the topic of the next chapter
of this work. However, even after this union of parties, the tensions
between President and Parliament did not diminished.
The peak of political confrontation was reached by president
Lucinschi’s initiative to increase his power by introducing
presidential system. On May 23, 1999 a referendum took place on the
initiative of Lucinschi. The question was raised: “Do you support
amending the constitution in order to introduce a presidential form of
government in the Republic of Modova, in which the President of the
Republic shall be responsible for forming and leading the government,
as well as for the results of the country’s governance?”29 The
referendum has been declared invalid (there were some struggles
between Parliament, President, and Judiciary concerning this issue)
due to low voter turnout of about 58 % out of necessary 60 %, however,
about 60 % of those who voted supported president by answering in
affirmative.30 President was applying to direct support of the
citizens, who gave him legitimacy.
After having little fights with Parliament, Lucinschi made next
radical step in his attempt to establish presidentialism. He signed up
a decree to create special commission to draft a law which presupposed
the extension of his authority.31 Decree presupposed that
“presidential rule would “improve the organization and activity of the
legislature and the executive, increase efficiency in public affairs,
speed up socioeconomic reforms, consolidate the rule of law and public
order, and restore public confidence in state structures.””32 Hence,
on August 4, 1999 president’s commission published a draft of
constitutional amendments, which blamed the existing system of
government for its instability. The draft included the right for the
president to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and ministers, to
become the head of the supreme Security Council, appoint prosecutors
and judges. 33 Moreover, according to the constitutional amendments
the president’s term should be extended to 5 years and the Parliament
mandates need to be decreased to 70.34 The president could also
dissolve the Parliament in case of blocking any law for more then two
months.35 Thus, according to the draft, President could gain very
broad authorities, which are very similar with super-presidential
Russian system.
The result of such step by the President towards changing the
political system was the very decisive move by the Parliament. On July
5, 2000 Moldovan Parliament rejected president’s draft towards
expansion of his power and canceled popular presidential elections in
the country.36 Ambitious president faced fiasco. Parliament voted in
favor of amending constitution and changing from semi-presidential
republic to parliamentary one. Therefore, President will be elected by
the Parliament (3/5 majority from the deputies or 61 deputy).
According to the amendment, Government received more power, but would
be formed exclusively by Parliament. The head of the state would be
the speaker of the Parliament, the Prime Minister would be the second
political figure, and the President would be considered as merely
figurehead for the parliamentary system.37 These are all the
characteristics of parliamentarism, which diminished power of
President, and broadened the Parliament authority.
Long political confrontation ended with the victory of the Parliament.
Parliamentary system left no chance for Lucinschi to be reelected,
because he had no support in the Parliament. This revealed some
drawbacks, which parliamentarism could bring such as taking over of
the presidency by charismatic communist leader Vladimir Voronin with
all its circumstances. According to some experts Lucinschi had many
chances to be reelected by people, as many saw him as a promoter of
economic reforms and better living conditions. But now people can
elect only the parliament members, who then choose the President,
situation which can lead to the political monopoly. In case of Moldova
it is arguable to say that by rather hasty amendment to the
constitution - in my view was mainly caused not by rational choice,
but by the result of confrontation, reallocation of the elite
interests and political fights – deputies made good and effective
decision by changing the system to the parliamentary one not taking
into consideration high number of communist in the Parliament and
underevaluating communists organizational order and connections. Time
of political tensions, turmoil, and confrontation favored communists
to make use of the situation and take over the power in a very
democratic way.
Communists Takeover
This chapter will describe the process of democratic takeover of the
power by communists. I will depict the parliamentary elections which
resulted in communist’s victory. This part of the work also aims to
show the current situation under the rule of the Communist Party and
how parliamentary system with all its advantages can lead to the lack
of pluralism, democratic principles, and the establishment of
political monopoly by one party.
Prior to the acquiring of high majority in the Parliament by the
communists, some interesting events took place in the political life
of Moldova. According to the amendments to the constitution, when time
came, the election of new president has to be done by the Parliament.
There were two candidates in this crucial presidential run. Vladimir
Voronin, the leader of the Communist Party (served as a minister of
interior in the Soviet times38) and centrist candidate Pavel Barbalat,
president of the Constitutional Court (served in the Judiciary Soviet
system).39 After unsuccessful rounds of president election, where
Voronin lacked only a few votes to get elected, and boycotting the
elections by the anti-communist coalition inspired by the leader of
Christian Democratic People’s Party (CDPP) Iurie Rosca, the President
according to the Constitutional provisions and terms, and after
consultations with the Constitutional Court dissolved the Parliament
and set the early Parliamentary elections for February 25, 2001.40
Failure to elect the president of the country resulted in the early
Parliament elections.
Anti-communist coalition leader who boycotted the third round hoping
that new early parliament elections would bring better results for
them and diminish the number of communists was mistaken. On 2001
Parliamentary elections the Communist Party (PC) gained 50.07 % of the
popular votes and acquired 71 mandate in the Parliament, Electoral
Bloc “Braghis Alliance” (BEAB), led by the Prime Minister Dumitru
Braghis and Christian Democratic People’s Party (CDPP) led by Iurie
Rosca received only 19 and 11 parliamentary seats correspondingly.41
Results of the elections crucially changed the political situation in
the country.
The Party of Communist received good field for actions. Controlling
more than three-fifths of Parliament, communists had free hands to
amend Constitution, elect president, and Prime Minister (what they did
shortly after). Political pluralism and turmoil ended with the
absolute control of the state by the Communists Party making the
Republic of Moldova the first former Soviet Republic who returned
communist rule back, though new Communists were more democratized.
From this time the paradise begins for the ruling party.
Parliament elected the President, or precisely speaking the Communist
Party, which had enough mandates to elect the head of state. The new
President of the Republic of Moldova became the communist leader
Vladimir Voronin, who right after the inauguration pointed out “that
human rights meant nothing if low living standards did not allow
people to live in dignity”, and supported “enlarging the role of the
presidency, despite the fact that he had endorsed the July 5, 2000,
constitutional reform reducing the powers of the head of state”.42
Moreover, on the Fourth Congress of the Party of the Communists of
Moldova Vladimir Voronin, after his reelection as a party leader, was
speaking about “the "deadlock of capitalism" and the "revival of
socialism," adding that the defeat of socialist systems was only
temporary”.43 From this time the absolute rule of the Party of the
Communists begin with all its drawbacks and constitutional violations.
Communists started to rule the country. Voronin nominated the Prime
Minister, who was his marionette. The Parliament has adopted the new
head of government, and the President was able to control and rule the
Government, the Parliament, which mostly constituted his party, and
the state in general. Hopeless opposition could not contradict the
policy of the President, as it had very few seats. Thus,
parliamentarism which is considered the most democratic form of
government resulted in the authoritarian rule under the democratic
principles, which is legitimated by the people.
Many experts criticizing the political situation in Moldova hoped that
new Parliamentary elections would change the picture and result in the
real power sharing. Last Parliamentary elections took place on March
6, 2005 bringing the majority of 56 seats in the Parliament to the
Communist Party, 11 mandates to the Christian Democratic People’s
Party (CDPP), and 34 seats to the Electoral Bloc “Moldova Democrata”
(BMD)44. Communists again received the victory, but needed 6 more
votes to elect the President according to the Constitution. Some
experts considered that no one from the deputies would support the
Communist Party in voting for Voronin again, and this would lead to
the gridlock. But to the great surprise, the enemy of the communists,
Christian democrats, entered into the coalition with communists and
the President of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin was
reelected. It showed once again the young political culture of
Moldova, where yesterday enemies became today’s allies. CDPP supported
communists in exchange on ministerial portfolios, promised by CP.
Thus, the Party of Communists managed not only to take, but also to
retake over the power in Moldova. Parliamentary system failed to work
properly in Moldavian political circumstances. Current political
situation leads to the higher extension of the President power by
increasing police role, biased Judiciary, lack of pluralism. Democracy
is only on the paper, but not in the reality. The spirit of old
communist way of ruling soars in the air.
Conclusion
Long way towards parliamentary system in Moldova ended up with the
political monopoly of the communists. Many factors lied in the base of
such outcome. The lack of democratic political culture, territorial
and linguistic conflict, continuity of political tensions and battles
between president and the parliament are all influenced the political
situation to which Moldova is now.
This work analyzed the process of constitution making, which was done
in three years of gaining independence by the country. Making
constitution was respectively smooth, but the amendments adopted by
the Parliament in the hasty way, led not to the very successful
outcomes in the new democracy of Moldova. Struggle of Presidents to
increase their power enforced Parliament to turn Republic to the
parliamentary system, hoping to diminish the striking authority of
president. However, the awakening of the communists, their strict
organization, influence, and stubbornness, supported by the people’s
unbelief in the new weak democrats, resulted in the gaining total
control under parliamentary, presidential, government, and judicial
institutions by the Party of Communists.
Parliamentary system, established after semi-presidentialism, towards
which country moved so long, failed to democratize Moldova and improve
its political situation. Communists rule undermined the effect of the
parliamentary system resulting in the democratic authoritarian way of
ruling the country. Democracy, as “the only rule of the game” led to
the authoritarianism backed by the democratically “effective”
parliamentary system. Moldova, with its old camp corrupted
politicians, unorganized parties (except the Party of Communists), and
weak opposition stepped far back in its economic and political
developments as it had in the middle 90s.
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1 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition
and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist
Europe (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press,
1996), 434.
2 Under legislature I mean Parliament.
3 Lucan A. Way, “Pluralism by Default in Moldova,” Journal of
Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002): 129, 127-140.
4 Ibid., 130.
5 Ibid., 130.
6 Political Parties of the Republic of Moldova, 1994 Parliamentary
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http://www.parties.e-democracy.md/en/electionresults/1994parliamentary/
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7 Ibid.
8 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (1994), art. 1, title 1.
www.docs.md (last accessed on January 14, 2006).
9 G. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into
Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (Houndmills: Macmillan Press,
1994), 132.
10 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (1994), art. 61, title 3.
www.docs.md (last accessed on January 14, 2006).
11 Ibid., art. 66, title 3.
12 Moldova, Government System. http://countrystudies.us/moldova/31.htm
(last accessed on January 14, 2006).
13 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (1994), art. 82, title 3.
www.docs.md (last accessed on January 14, 2006).
14 Ibid., art. 85, title 3.
15 Ibid., art. 97, title 3.
16 Ibid., art 101, title 3.
17 Political Parties of the Republic of Moldova, 1996 Presidential
Elections
http://www.parties.e-democracy.md/en/electionresults/1996presidential/
(last accessed on January 14, 2006).
18 Ibid.
19 Eastern Europe Newsletter, 12 October 1996, vol. 10, no. 20, p.8 in
Ian Jeffries, The Countries of the Former Soviet Union at the Turn of
the Twenty-first Century: The Baltic and European states in transition
(London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), 330.
20 Political Parties of the Republic of Moldova, 1996 Presidential
Elections
http://www.parties.e-democracy.md/en/electionresults/1996presidential/
(last accessed on January 14, 2006).
21 Business Central Europe 1997: 50-1 in Ian Jeffries, The Countries
of the Former Soviet Union at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century:
The Baltic and European states in transition (London and New York:
Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), 332.
22 Constitutional Watch. A country-by-country update on constitutional
politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR. in East European
Constititutional Review, vol. 6 no. 4, 1997.
23 Ibid.
24 Political Parties of the Republic of Moldova, 1998 Parliamentary
Elections
http://www.parties.e-democracy.md/en/electionresults/1998parliamentary/
(last accessed on January 14, 2006).
25 Ibid.
26 Constitutional Watch. A country-by-country update on constitutional
politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR. in East European
Constititutional Review, vol. 7 no. 1, 1998.
27 Political Parties of the Republic of Moldova, 1998 Parliamentary
Elections
http://www.parties.e-democracy.md/en/electionresults/1998parliamentary/
(last accessed on January 14, 2006).
28 Constitutional Watch. A country-by-country update on constitutional
politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR. in East European
Constititutional Review, vol. 7 no. 2, 1998.
29 Moldovan Economic Trend, Monthly issue, June 1999, p.3 in Ian
Jeffries, The Countries of the Former Soviet Union at the Turn of the
Twenty-first Century: The Baltic and European states in transition
(London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), 333.
30 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1999, vol. 51, no. 21, pp.
15-16 in Ian Jeffries, The Countries of the Former Soviet Union at the
Turn of the Twenty-first Century: The Baltic and European states in
transition (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group,
2004), 333.
31 Constitutional Watch. A country-by-country update on constitutional
politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR. in East European
Constititutional Review, vol. 8 no. 4, 1999.
32 Ibid.
33 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1999, vol. 51, no. 31, p. 13 in
Ian Jeffries, The Countries of the Former Soviet Union at the Turn of
the Twenty-first Century: The Baltic and European states in transition
(London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), 334.
34 Ibid., 334.
35 Ibid., 334.
36 Sevodnia, 6 July 2000, p.3: Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
2000, vol. 52, no. 27, pp. 16-17 in Ian Jeffries, The Countries of the
Former Soviet Union at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century: The
Baltic and European states in transition (London and New York:
Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), 334.
37 Ibid., 335.
38 Voronin’s previous Soviet experience as a minister of interior was
highly reflected in his way of ruling the country by increased power
of police structures, investigation institutions, and persecution
policy.
39 Constitutional Watch. A country-by-country update on constitutional
politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR. in East European
Constititutional Review, vol. 9 no. 4, 2000.
40 Ibid.
41 Political Parties of the Republic of Moldova, 2001 Parliamentary
Elections
http://www.parties.e-democracy.md/en/electionresults/2001parliamentary/
(last accessed on January 14, 2006).
42 Constitutional Watch. A country-by-country update on constitutional
politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR. in East European
Constititutional Review, vol. 10 no. 2, 2001.
43 Ibid.
44 Political Parties of the Republic of Moldova, 2005 Parliamentary
Elections http://www.elections2005.md/results/ (last accessed on
January 14, 2006).